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NOTE
PRICE FIXING ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL: FREE SPEECH
AND EQUAL PROTECTION CONFLICTS WITH SPENDING
LIMITATIONS ESTABLISHED IN THE FEDERAL ELECTION
CAMPAIGN ACT AMENDMENTS OF

1974

INTRODUCTION

In the years 1972 to 1974, the political institutions of the
United States sustained the greatest scandal in our country's 200
years of existence. Watergate brought out all that is bad in political campaign financing: Individual donors' giving large sums of
money to win influence of ambassadorships;' a former cabinet
member's serving as a bag man, collecting illegal contributions
from corporations fearful of retaliation if no donation were given;2
large, unneeded sums of money's sitting in diverse bank accounts
and private safes, eventually used to finance break-ins and hush
payments. 3 It was these aspects of political fundraising, as well
as others, that led one prominent Illinois fundraiser to the conclusion that "fundraising is a seamy, tawdry business, but it must
be done." 4
As the costs of campaigns continue to rise, the necessity for
fundraising becomes more apparent. In 1968, approximately $300
million was spent on all elections held in the United States,' while
in 1972, the figure rose to $400 million! The 1972 primary and
general election candidates for the House and Senate spent
$77,255,078 for the period of April 7 through December 31.1 The
See TIME, April 16, 1973, at 8.
See Hearings Before the Select Committee on PresidentialCampaign Activities of
the United States Senate, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5494-521 (1973).
1 See SUBMISSION OF RECORDED PRESIDENTIAL CONVERSATIONS TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BY PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON 188-207 (1974)
(March 31, 1973, meeting between Richard Nixon and John Dean) (transcripts of White
House tapes).
I Conversation with Angelo G. Geocaris, fundraiser for Illinois Governor Daniel
Walker, winter 1973.
H. ALEXANDER, POLITICAL FINANCING 38 (1972).
Hearings on S.372 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 219 (1973) (statement by H. E. Alexander)
[hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings].
' Common Cause Press Release, "Total Campaign Finances in the 1972 Congressional
Races," Report No. 1, Sept. 13, 1973, on file with the Denver Law Journal.
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Senate Commerce Committee in 1971 declared that one purpose
of campaign reform was to "halt the spiraling cost of campaigning
for public office." ' Campaign spending seemed to be getting out
of control.
These figures, however, need to be put in some perspective.
The $300 million spent in 1968 represented less than one-tenth of
one percent of all money spent by the government, and came to
about $1.50 per citizen to elect over 500,000 political officials.'
Proctor and Gamble in that same year spent $270 million on
advertising alone. 0 These figures led Herbert Alexander, Director
of the Citizens' Research Foundation and long-time advocate of
campaign reform, to conclude that rather than being over priced,
politics is underfinanced:
$400 million is just a fraction of one percent of the amounts spent
by governments at all levels, and that is what politics is all about,
gaining control of governments to decide policies on, among other
things, how tax money will be spent."

While seemingly large amounts of money are spent in political campaigns, one must consider these costs in light of the educational function a campaign serves. The Committee report on
the 1974 bill proposing spending ceilings cited a Harvard study
suggesting that rather than too much, not enough money is being
spent to educate the electorate.
Watergate and related events tend to place the issue in the context
of preventing excessive spending and controlling "corruption." The
idea is that the less money spent, the less needs to be raised, and
thus the purer the process. Completely neglected in this statement
of the issue is the need for campaigns to serve the broader public
purposes and currently proposed spending limits just would not permit this to be done. U

But the American people see otherwise. In a Gallup Poll
taken in November 1972, those interviewed expressed an overwhelming desire to place limits on the amount of money in campaign coffers. 3 Two years later, the people had what they wanted.
s S. REP. No. 92-96, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1971).

H. ALEXANDER, supra note 5, at 38-39.
10Id.at 39.
I
12

1973 Hearings, supra note 6, at 219.
H.R. REP. No. 93-1239, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 152 (1974).

Washington Post, Nov. 30, 1972, § A, at 2, col. 4. In response to the question,
"Would you favor or oppose a law which would put a limit on the total amount of money

which can be spent for or by a candidate in his campaign for public office?", the response
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The Congress overwhelmingly passed the Federal Elections Campaign Act Amendments of 1974's (the Campaign Act of 1974), and
it was signed into law on October 15, 1974. The key effects of this
new law are to:
(1) establish ceilings on the amounts an individual may contribute
to any one campaign for federal office;
(2) establish a $25,000 ceiling on the aggregate amount anyone
may contribute to federal campaigns in any one election year;
(3) establish a ceiling on the amount of personal funds a candidate
for federal office may himself contribute to or spend on his own
campaign;
(4) establish limitations on campaign expenditures for congressional and presidential campaigns; and
(5) provide for voluntary public financing of presidential primary
and general elections. 5

The first four provisions may well conflict with the first
amendment guarantees of freedom of speech in that each would,
to some degree, restrict the freedom of expression of both the
candidates and the electorate. The fourth provision, the establishment of limitations on campaign expenditures, however,
seems to be the most constitutionally infirm, both on its face and
in its application.
While many in Congress expressed sincere reservations about
ceilings on expenditures,'" few voted against the bill the day it
passed. This paradox is the natural consequence of a political
process "filled with arbitrary compromises and responsive as in
some degree it must be to . . .short run pressures . .'.1.7One
short-run pressure which must have been on the minds of the
members of Congress when the final vote was taken was the unwas: Favor, 71%; oppose, 18%; no opinion, 11%. Id.
" The Campaign Act of 1974 passed the Senate by a vote of 60 to 16. 120 CONG. REC.

S.18,455 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1974). It was passed by the House by a vote of 365 to 24. Id. at
H.R. 10,344-45 (Oct. 10, 1974).
,1Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified in
scattered sections of 2, 18, 26 U.S.C.A.).
" See generally 120 CONG. REc. (daily ed. March 26, 27, 29; April 1-5, 8-11, 1974) (S.
3044 considered and passed by the Senate); Id. (Aug. 7, 8, 1974) (H.R. 16,090 considered
and passed by the House); Id. (Oct. 8, 1974) (Senate considered and passed the Conference

Rep.); Id. (Oct. 10, 1974) (House considered and passed the Conference Rep.); 1973
Hearings, supra note 6; Hearings on H.R. 7612 [and] S. 372 Before the Subcomm. on
Elections of the Comm. on House Administration, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (Supp. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 7612 (Supp.)].
11Cox, The Role of Congress in ConstitutionalDeterminations,40 U. CINN. L. REv.
199, 220 (1971).
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pleasant and politically unpopular task of having to explain to
their constituents a vote against reform legislation in a campaign
year dominated by corruption.
In this as in other instances, legislators' votes may result
from the pressures of Gallup Polls, constituent demands, and
national scandal rather than from consideration of more enduring
values, such as constitutional considerations. Senator James
Buckley lent support to this belief when he stated on the floor of
the Senate that the constitutional aspects of the Campaign Act
of 1974 were almost totally ignored by the Congress. 8 One reason
the constitutional aspects are not accorded their due respect in
the halls of Congress may be the result of "a feeling that because
the Supreme Court has the ultimate say on most constitutional
issues, other institutions of government, not to mention citizen
observers, need not concern themselves with the constitutionality
of legislative action."' 9
This note is directed generally at the issues a court of law
must consider in passing upon the constitutionality of placing
limitations on campaign expenditures, with specific references to
the ceilings provided for in the 1974 Act. The discussion is limited
to congressional ceilings; consideration of the issues behind ceilings on presidential campaigns is omitted.
I.

A.

SPENDING LIMITATIONS AND FREE SPEECH

Speech in a Political Setting

The Campaign Act of 1974 provides for expenditure ceilings
on the amounts of money which may be spent for political campaigning in both Senate and House races." The Act also contains
120 CONG. REc. S. 5707 (daily ed. April 10, 1974).
'g H. PENNIMAN

& R.

WINTER,

CAMPAIGN FINANCES:

Two

ViEws OF THE POLITICAL AND

CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 59 (1971).

18 U.S.C.A. § 608(c)(1)(C)-(E) (Supp. 1,1975).
(c)(1) No candidate shall make expenditures in excess of(C) in the case of any campaign for nomination for election by a candidate for the office of Senator or by a candidate for the office of Representative
from a State which is entitled to only one Representative, the greater of(i) 8 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the State
or
(ii) $100,000;
(D) in the case of any campaign for election by a candidate for the
office of Senator or by a candidate for the office of Representative from a
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a provision excluding from the ceilings those costs, up to 20 per. cent of the appropriate spending ceiling, incurred in the course
of raising funds.' Thus, for example, a candidate for the House
from a state having more than one representative, may spend in
each election $84,000, i.e., the $70,000 ceiling plus an additional
20 percent, or $14,000, if at least $14,000 of a candidate's expenditures have been incurred in the course of raising funds. There is,
in addition, a provision in the law which ties the ceiling level to
22
any rise in the cost of living.
While the ultimate effects of a limitation on campaign expenditures may be the subject of much dispute and diverse opinion, one effect of the new law seems very clear: It results in an
infringement of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the first
2
amendment. 1
State which is entitled to only one Representative, the greater of(i) 12 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the State
or

V

(ii) $150,000;
(E) $70,000, in the case of any campaign for nomination for election,
or for election, by a candidate for the office of Representative in any other
State ....
18 U.S.C.A. § 591(f)(4)(H)(Supp. I, 1975).
(f) "expenditure"- ....
(4) does not include(H) any costs incurred by a candidate in connection with the solicitation of contributions by such candidate, except that this clause shall not
apply with respect to costs incurred by a candidate in excess of an amount
equal to 20 percent of the expenditure limitation applicable to such candidate under section 608(c) of this title ....

Id.
, Id. § 608(d)(1):
At the beginning of each calendar year (commencing in 1976), as there
become available necessary data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the
Department of Labor, the Secretary of Labor shall certify to the Commission
and publish in the Federal Register the per centum difference between the
price index for the 12 months preceding the beginning of such calendar year
and the price index for the base period. Each limitation established by
subsection (c) and subsection (f) shall be increased by such per centum
difference. Each amount so increased shall be the amount in effect for such
calendar year.
120 CONG. REc. S. 5703 (daily ed. April 10, 1974) (remarks by Senator Buckley).
See also R. WINTER, CAMPAIGN FINANCING AND POLITICAL FREEDOM (1973); Fleishman,
Freedom of Speech and Equality of Political Opportunity: The Constitutionalityof the
Federal Election CampaignAct of 1971, 51 N. CAROLINA L. REv. 387 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Fleishman]; Rosenthal, Campaign Financingand the Constitution, 9 HARv. J.
LEGis. 359 (1972).
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One reason that free speech is so greatly affected by ceilings
on spending can be found in the changing nature of campaigns.
A soapbox campaign, as an effective means of communicating
with a large percentage of the population, has long since become
obsolete. In today's complex society, wide-spread communication
of a candidate's views and positions requires substantial expenditures of money for media, literature, mailings, and organization.
To the degree that a spending ceiling limits these activities, a
candidate's free speech-his right to communicate with the voters-has been abridged. Professor Ralph Winter has advanced
the proposition that if free speech does nothing else, it protects
"explicit political activity;" 4 he argues that a ceiling on spending
is merely an attempt to limit this protected activity. 5
The Washington State Supreme Court has recently struck
down a state statute which established ceilings on campaign expenditures." While relying on the principle of vagueness in reaching its determination of unconstitutionality, the court found a
serious first amendment infringement in that a ceiling
is fatally defective because it can operate to prohibit absolutely
plaintiff and others from exercising their constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech. The defendants argue that the section
merely imposes a regulation on the amount of money which can be
spent in communicating. However . . . [t]o communicate effec-

tively with the mass of voters, one cannot be limited to verbal communication person-to-person, but must use the media in one form
or another.n

There is also support for the argument that expenditure ceilings prohibiting one from
making an individual contribution may violate one's freedom of association. See 120
CONG. REc. S.18,537 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1974) (remarks of Senator Buckley). Professor
Winter has said:
Contributions to a candidate permits individuals to pool their resources and
voice their message far more effectively than if each spoke singly. This is
critically important because it permits citizens to join a potential organization and propagate their views beyond their voting districts.
R. WIrTR, supra note 23, at 64. While the Constitution makes no mention of freedom of
association, it has evolved as an important element of the first amendment. The Supreme
Court stated in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958), that "[iut is beyond debate
that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an
inseparable aspect of 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech." See also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23, 30 (1968).
2,H. PENNIMAN & R. WINTER, supra note 19, at 60.
25

Id.

" Bare v. Gorton, 84 Wash. 2d 380, 526 P.2d 379 (1974).
"

Id. at 385, 526 P.2d at 382.
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In order to evaluate the degree to which the free exercise of
speech is affected, it is necessary to put the infringed right in its
proper milieu. This law is not aimed at speech which can be
characterized as obscene, loud or raucous, inciteful, or inimical
to the concepts of our democratic process. Rather, the type of
speech curtailed by campaign spending ceilings forms the very
basis of the responsive, democratic form of government which we
have enjoyed since the founding of the nation. This speech is "the
rock on which our government stands." 8
The Campaign Act of 1974 is a legislative attempt to establish a limit on the amount of speech which may be undertaken
during the course of a campaign for federal office. The words of
Justice Black in Mills v. Alabama" have an unmistakable relevance to this attempt by the Congress to limit campaign debate:
Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First
Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major
purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs. This of course included the discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in which
government is operated or should be operated, and all such matters
relating to political processes. 0

All hard fought campaigns for the U. S. Congress embrace discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government, and the
manner in which government is or should be operated.
It is generally accepted that free speech is not guaranteed to
all speaking. 3 However, when one speaks to the issues upon
which voters must decide, speech should be afforded its greatest
protection, for one of the purposes of the first amendment
is to give to every voting member of the body politic the fullest
possible participation in the understanding of those problems with
which the citizens of a self-governing society must deal. When a free
man is voting, it is not enough that the truth is known by someone
else . . . .The voters must have it, all of them. The primary purpose of the First Amendment is, then, that all the citizens shall as
far as possible, understand the issues which bear upon our common
life. That is why no idea, no opinion, no doubt, no belief, no counterbelief, no relevant information, may be kept from them. 2
2 A. MELEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 91 (1948).

- 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
' Id. at 219.
s'Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
32 A. MEIKLEJoHN, supra note 28, at 88-89.
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The Supreme Court has recognized in numerous landmark
cases that the high degree of protection assigned political speech
is the necessary consequence of any self-government." This is
true not simply for the benefit of those expounding diverse ideas,
nor for the benefit of candidates debating the crucial issues of any
one campaign. Rather, the freedom of speech in a political setting
is afforded the greatest protection for the benefit of those who
must decide how to cast their votes each and every time an election is held. The Supreme Court has long recognized the importance of receiving information as the corollary to the first amendment right to freedom of speech, and has made constant references to this right. 4 Throughout the discussion of the constitutionality of spending limitations on campaigns, the right of the
people to receive adequate information on which to base their
votes must not be forgotten."
In turning to the role of the Court in passing upon the constitutionality of the Campaign Act of 1974, it is well to keep in mind
the words of Justice Brennan in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan. 3 Like that case, any case in which the Court considers
the constitutionality of the spending ceilings will be considered
"against the background of a profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide open .... ''37
B. The Court's Approach to Infringements on Speech
It has been a long-acknowledged principle of law that although the Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no

law

. . .

abridging the freedom of speech," 3 this is not itself an

absolute prohibition against laws which may for various reasons
infringe on this freedom.3 9 The Court has from time to time estabSee Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64
(1964); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1
(1949).
' See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367 (1969); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U.S. 141 (1943).
See Comment, Free Speech Implications of Campaign Expenditure Ceilings, 7
HARV. Ctv. RIGHTs-CIV. Lia. L. REv., 214, 225-29 (1972).
3,376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id. at 270.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
31

See Adderly.v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951);
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lished various tests by which it can judge the alleged infringements to determine their constitutionality. Three tests have
emerged as a guide for the Court: (1) the local community standards test;" (2) the clear and present danger test;" and -(3) the
"balancing test."'" Each test is more or less designed as a test of
a particular type of infringement in a specific context. The local
community standard test has been applied to speech attacked as
obscene;"3 the clear and present danger test has been used in the
"regulation of subversive activity and of the publication of matter
thought to obstruct justice;"' 44 and the balancing test has been
applied "primarily in the case of regulations not intended directly
to condemn the content of speech but incidentally limiting its
exercise.""
It is clear that the establishment of ceilings on expenditures
does not fit within the context of the local community standard
test. The applicability of the clear and present danger test is
inappropriate because excessive spending in campaigns could
hardly be considered as subversive activity "believed to endanger
the safety of the Nation."4 This is particularly true in light of the
Court's decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 7 which further limited
this test to advocacy "directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and [which] is likely to incite or produce such
action.""' The imminency required by Brandenburg is absent in
the case of excessive campaign expenditures.
It is the balancing test which is most likely to be applied by
the Court in reaching a determination of the constitutionality of
spending ceilings, for, at least ostensibly, the purpose of Congress
in enacting the ceiling was not to limit the content, but to limit
the unnecessary and excessive exercise of campaign speech." One
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919);
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919).
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
" Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
42 Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1, 11 (1965).
45

Id.

,6 Id. at 8.
,7 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
41 Id. at 447.
," But see text accompanying notes 121-38 infra.
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must, therefore, scrutinize the balancing test itself, in relation to
the ceilings established in the Campaign Act of 1974, to arrive at
a conclusion as to the constitutionality of the ceiling.
C.

The Balancing Test

Very simply stated, the balancing test is a weighing of the
interests sacrificed against the value to society of the goals sought
to be achieved by a particular act of Congress." In the case of
ceilings on campaign spending, the interests sacrificed are first
amendment freedoms in a political setting. These must be balanced against the government's interest in the preservation of the
purity of the electoral process. In United States v. O'Brien,5
Chief Justice Warren summarized the nature of the requisite governmental interest as well as the degree of balancing necessary for
legislative infringements on protected freedoms to survive the
scrutiny of the Court:
To characterize the quality of the governmental interest which must
appear, the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong.
Whatever imprecision inheres in these terms, we think it clear that
a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than
52
is essential to the furtherance of that interest.

Under this test, a legislative infringement on first amendment
freedoms is likely to be upheld only if four elements are satisfied:
(1) there is constitutional power to legislate; (2) an important or
substantial interest is furthered; (3) the interest is unrelated to
suppression of speech; and (4) the restriction on first amendment
freedoms is incidental and no greater than is essential to promote
the interest. Congressional power to regulate campaign spending,
the first element of the O'Brien test, is clearly granted in article
I, section four of the Constitution 53 and is also implied in the
'

Rosenthal, supra note 23, at 372.

51391 U.S. 367 (1968).
12 Id. at 376-77 (footnotes omitted).
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof;
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations,
except as to the Places of chusing Senators.
U.S. CONST.

art. I, § 4(1).
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Commerce Clause. Therefore no discussion of this element will be
undertaken."

1. Furtherance of a Substantial Interest
The second element of the test enumerated in O'Brien is that
to justify legislative infringement on speech, an important or substantial interest must be promoted. Prevention of numerous evils
has been advanced as the government's interest in campaign reform generally, and in ceilings specifically. The rationale for reform can generally be resolved into three catagories: (1) fear that
the high cost of campaigns will lead to a dependence on a small
number of large contributors; (2) fear that the inequalities which
result from one candidate's having far greater financial resources
will lead to a highly unbalanced presentation of candidates' views
and qualities before the American electorate, and that competition among candidates will be distorted by inequality of opportunity to communicate with the voters; and (3) fear that spiraling
campaign costs will deter many well qualified people from seeking office. 5 While a limitation on expenditures may appear to
meet these evils head on and thus accomplish the goals, a closer
evaluation reveals that a ceiling may not inhibit them at all.
a. Candidates' Dependence on Large Contributors
It has been suggested that a limit on spending can reduce the
financial liabilities of candidates who must raise large sums of
money to campaign for public office. 8 This line of reasoning is
predicated on the belief that the more money a candidate spends,
the more likely it is that the candidate will turn to large donors.
While certainly true in a good many instances, this is by no
means the universal case. The Tenth Congressional District of
Illinois was the site of one of the closest as well as the most
expensive House race in 1974.11 Yet the entire amount spent was

11

See A. ROSENTHAL, FEDERAL REGULATION OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE: SOME CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS 12-15 (1972). See also, United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948); United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); Ex parte
Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
5 See Rosenthal, supra note 23, at 360.
Note, Campaign Spending Regulation: Failure of the FirstStep, 8 HARv. J. LEGIs.
640, 646 (1971).
11 Both candidates, according to reports filed with the Clerk of the House of Representatives, spent a combined total of $537,474. Common Cause Press Release, April 11,
1975, on file with the Denver Law Journal.The winner received 51.3 percent of the vote.
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financed by contributions limited to $3,000 per contributor.1
Abner Mikva, the Democrat and ultimate victor, received close
to half of his funds in contributions of under $100. 59
While one need not always resort to large donors as one's
spending increases, the influence of large donors would not necessarily be removed by the establishment of an expenditure ceiling.
Were there no attempt to limit the size of contributions, 0 one
could still receive the entire ceiling amount from large donors.
Thus it is a reduction in the level of individual contributions, not
the establishment of ceilings on expenditures, that will serve to
eliminate the potentially corruptive effects of large donations.
Additionally, in establishing a maximum ceiling of $168,000
in a race for the House,"1 it is possible, even with a provision
limiting individual contributions to $1,000 or less, that some individuals wishing to donate to the candidate of their choice may be
barred by a prior attainment of the ceiling limit by the candidate.
This potential turning away of donors is exactly the opposite of
what is desired. According to Representative James Cleveland,
"Often the act of contributing is the most direct opportunity open
to the individual, beyond the act of voting, to express his will. We
should preserve this, expand it, and give even greater leverage to
the small individual contributor.""2 Studies show us that only 14
percent of the voters have even been asked to contribute, and only
9 percent have ever done So.13 If the ranks of contributors are to
- Both Mikva and Young adhered to a self-imposed limit of $3,000 per contributor.
The Campaign Act of 1974 effectively limits the individual to a contribution total of
$2,000-$1,000 in the primary, and $1,000 in the general election. See note 60 infra.
1,Interview with Jack Marco, former campaign manager for Representative Abner
Mikva, in Skokie, Ill., March 24, 1975.
The Campaign Act of 1974 does provide for a ceiling on contributions:
(b)(1) Except as otherwise provided by paragraphs (2) and (3), no
person shall make contributions to any candidate with respect to any election for Federal office which, in the aggregate, exceed $1,000.
(5) The limitations imposed by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection shall apply separately with respect to each election, except that all
elections held in any calendar year for the office of President of the United
States (except a general election for such office).shall be considered to be one
election.
18 U.S.C.A. § 608(b)(1) & (5) (Supp. I, 1975).
" The candidate is allowed $84,000 for the primary and $84,000 for the general election. See notes 20 & 21 supra.
02 Hearings on H.R. 7612 (Supp.), at 3.
Id. at 9 (statement by Representative H. Johnson). See generally 1973 Hearings,
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expand in number, the law must provide greater incentives for
small individual contributions, not prohibitions against them.
The central point is this: Very few people could suggest that
a candidate had developed financial liabilities no matter how
much he spends, providing that the money came from the right
places and in small enough amounts." A ceiling will neither ensure that the source is beyond reproach, nor that the amounts
given are small.
b. Inequality of Financial Resources and Unbalanced
Presentation
A second interest of reform legislation is the elimination of
inequalities of opportunity to communicate with the voters in
order to assure a balanced presentation of all sides of every issue,
and to prevent a candidate with greater resources from drowning
out the voice of his opponent with massive media, mailings, or
organization.
It becomes apparent that ceilings on expenditures fail to
achieve the desired result. Those who have the greatest difficulty
in projecting their views and qualifications before the voters, and
who are supposedly the ones who would benefit the most from a
limitation on spending, are third party candidates and those with
meager financial resources, poor name recognition, or poor issue
identification. Professor Martin Redish discusses the plight of the
resourceless candidates who cannot afford to put their views
across to the electorate:
[S]pending limitations ...

fail to aid poorer third parties or finan-

cially lacking candidates in a manner which advances the fundamental goals of the first amendment. For such limitations in no way
help these individuals familiarize the public with their names and
policies. At most, all the spending ceilings can hope to do is to keep
the voters as unfamiliar with the candidates who have access to
large financial support as they are with the less wealthy. In the
words of one commentator, "the most important effect of money in
a political campaign is not that the candidate with the most money
will win, but that the candidate with the lesser amount of money
will not be able to present his case to undecided voters."'"
supra note 6, at 109-26 (testimony of Senator G. McGovern).
" 1973 Hearings, supra note 6, at 61.

Redish, Campaign Spending Laws and the First Amendment, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv.

900, 919 (1971) (footnotes omitted).
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It is immediately obvious that a ceiling will not provide the
poorer candidate with postage for district-wide mailings or
cheaper rates for television spots. Instead, the only effect will be
to curtail the amount of information voters will be able to receive
from the more wealthy candidates. From this perspective, a ceiling acts more as a penalty on wealth than as an aid to those most
in need; money is effectively taken from the purse of the rich, but
is not in any way distributed to the poor. The uninformed become
less informed.
To meet the goal of an educated electorate one needs to
develop the concept of a floor, not a ceiling. 6 Reform legislation
should provide a certain minimum resource level for bonafide
candidates so as to guarantee that even the less wealthy or less
well known candidates can achieve a minimum of name recognition and publicity. Such a proposal will be examined below. 7
The use of a ceiling as a device to prevent one candidate from
drowning out his opponent has found adherents in the halls of
Congress, where incumbents have expressed alarm at the possibility that a wealthy candidate may enter a race, pour thousands
of dollars into a media campaign, and thereby effectively neutralize the advantage of name recognition which an incumbent enjoys. 8 An argument can be made that extravagant media campaigns can drown out opponents. It may also be contended that
such campaigns cheapen the electoral selection process by promoting images and impressions rather than issues and programs,
thereby lessening the educational role of a campaign. There are
grave questions, however, as to a ceiling on expenditures as a
means to rectify these evils.
In drafting the first amendment, our Founding Fathers must
have placed a great deal of faith in the people to sift through all
the campaign rhetoric that might pass their way. The dreaded
effects of a media campaign on a voter should be considered in
light of a basic faith in the American electorate.
This concern over information which "insults" the voter or "overwhelms" him represents a basic lack of faith in the ability of the
individual to sort out the logical from the illogical, the important

S7

On the subject of floors, see Fleishman at 479; 1973 Hearings,supra note 6, at 224.
See notes 116-20 infra, and accompanying text.
See generally 1973 Hearings, supra note 6, at 95-98 (testimony of Representative

Murphy).
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from the frivolous. Whether such a lack of faith is justified is open
to question. But the fact remains that the first amendment, and
indeed the whole concept of self-government, are premised on the
concept that the individual does have this ability (whether he
chooses to use it or not), and until that concept is rejected, any
governmental efforts to protect the public from confusing or irrational information in the political sphere must be considered inconsistent with the policy of the first amendment. The theory of the
"marketplace of ideas" is that irrational information will merely
spotlight by contrast the rational or correct course. 6

If a media campaign is to be rejected, it should be rejected
by the people who are subjected to it, not by a legislative act
which infringes on first amendment rights. Evidence does support
the theory that voters will reject a campaign which they consider
to contain excessive media.
A 1974 post-election survey in the Tenth Congressional District of Illinois revealed one voter who did indeed "reject" what
she thought to be excessive advertising. 70 The Mikva campaign,
as its only attempt at broadcast media advertising during the
1974 elections, developed a radio spot in which the interest group
ratings of the two candidates were compared. The same advertisement was run several times a day for several weeks. In the
post-election survey, the respondent, a Democrat, gave this as her
reason for voting as she did:
Well, I think Mikva (the Democrat) is the most qualified. I have
always liked him and voted for him in 1972. But it's funny, I got so
sick of hearing that damn commercial about the ratings that I voted
for Young. You probably think that's stupid, don't you?7"

While it is apparent that this woman rejected what she considered to be excessive advertising, consideration should also be
given to the voter who seldom listened to the two stations on
which the advertisement was broadcast, and heard it for the first
time only days before the election. It is true that if someone hears
a commerical 30 times and receives the entire message the first 3
times they hear it, the last 27 times may be wasted. 2 This is not
true, however, for those individuals who hear it for the first time
" Redish, supra note 65, at 911 (footnotes omitted).
" This survey, in which the author took part, was designed to give the Mikva cam-

paign some indication of the effectiveness of various campaign activities.
"' Telephone interview in Evanston, Ill., Nov. 12, 1974. The respondents were asked
to name two or three reasons why they voted as they did.
72 Redish, supra note 65, at 913.
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on the 16th, 25th, or 30th time it is broadcast. There were surely
a good many individuals in the Tenth District who never once
heard that "damn commercial about the ratings," as well as
many who heard it once or twice, but not enough to recall the
content. A spending ceiling may prevent more individuals from
hearing such campaign advertisements. Therefore, not merely the
right of a candidate to broadcast his views, but also the first
amendment right of the voters to hear these broadcasts is at
stake.
Finally, an attempt to equalize opportunity to be heard in
the campaign forum falsely assumes "that someone-presumably
Congress-knows how much information is the right amount
.... ,,7There is, however, inherent in any attempt by the Congress to establish a ceiling the following "Catch-22."
There are two competing factors which must be taken into
account in setting the ceiling, and in the final analysis, they are
mutually exclusive. First, unless the ceiling is set fairly high, few
challengers will be able to mount a successful campaign against
an incumbent. The advantages of incumbency, in terms of name
recognition, constituent service, and the advantages that inhere
in most all elective offices, are formidable obstacles to overcome."
Second, to be balanced against this need for a high ceiling is the
need for a ceiling low enough to ensure that a candidate of limited
means will not be outspent by too great a margin. If the ceiling
adopted by Congress in the Campaign Act of 1974 is supposed to
meet this goal, it has missed its mark, for the ceiling established
is far too high to aid most of the resourceless candidates. The
average amounts raised by incumbents and challengers in House
contests in 1972 were $58,359 and $31,355 respectively." The average raised by incumbents actually falls short by $25,641 of what
candidates may now spend in the primary alone. An additional
$84,000 may then be spent in the general election. To the average
challenger who was able to scrape up only $31,355 in 1972, it will
be small comfort to realize that the incumbent is limited to a
mere $168,000 in his combined 1976 primary and general election
campaign.
Fleishman at 455.
7,See text accompanying notes 160-75, infra.
Rohde, PublicFinancing of Federal Election Campaigns, 6 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS
L. Rav. 43 (1974).
"
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The ceiling that has been set for the House races-$84,000
each for the primary and the general campaigns-is clearly too
high to aid a candidate with limited resources. This ceiling may
also be too low to enable an effective challenge against an incumbent.78 This leads to the conclusion that:
[I]f one really believes the people are so easily fooled and so in need
of protection, there is no end to the campaign tactics eligible for
regulation and no end to the need to increase the power of those not
fooling the public. Indeed, the most disquieting aspect of the drive
to regulate campaign money is that so many of its adherents view
themselves as possessing a monopoly of political truth."

c.

Deterrence of Potential Candidates

Finally, there is the question of deterrence: Will able candidates be deterred from running for office by large campaign costs?
The most important aspect in an analysis of this question relates
to the availability of funds, and to the factors which determine
to whom campaign donations go. The traditional argument is
that money flows to incumbents,78 not to challengers. If this is in
fact true, then challengers may well be deterred from entering a
race. In the 1972 House races, incumbents were able to outraise
their challengers by a margin of almost two to one. On the Senate side the inequality was even greater, incumbents raising
$525,809 and challengers only $243,070.10 Common Cause has
gone so far as to declare that we have a party of neither Democrats nor Republicans, but "an Incumbency party which operates
a monopoly."'"
There is, however, an alternative theory to suggest to whom
money flows and why. Professor Fleishman suggests that the
amount of money raised is an indication of a candidate's support,
rather than the means of his obtaining support." The hypothesis
is that the more likely to win a candidate appears, the more
support he will have and the more money he will attract, whether
an incumbent or a challenger. The reverse would also be true: The
"'

See text accompanying notes 147-50, 157-59, infra.
R. WINTER, supra note 23, at 12.
7' This is the conclusion reached by Common Cause after an extensive analysis of
1972 campaign spending. 31 CoNG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 3130 (1973).
"' Rohde, supra note 75.
a Id. at 44.
1,Common Cause, supra note 7, "Common Cause Releases Study of 1972 Congres,7

sional Campaign Finances."
82 Fleishman at 459.
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less likely to win one appears the less support he will receive.
Senator Baker addressed himself to the relationship between raising money and getting votes:
It seems to me that during this hearing, we need to keep clearly
in mind the fact that in the American elective process, the campaign, the effort to have a broad base of voter support is only narrowly more intensive than the campaign to have a broad base of
financial support which I think subsequently negates the idea that
the public should be or is cynical about the large sums of money that
are spent."

There is some statistical support for the hypothesis that the
likelihood of winning attracts money. Thirteen of the 40 challengers for House seats who were successful in 1974 also ran in 1972.
The average amount spent by those 13 candidates in their first
bid for election was $59,218, while the expenditures by the same
challengers averaged $112,483 in 1974.84 This dramatic 90 percent
increase could be the result of the increased perception on the
part of the voters supporting the challengers (or opposing their
opponents) that the possibility of a victory was better in 1974
than in 1972. The candidate, once perceived as a likely winner,
would attract greater resources and thus be able to spend more
money. Statistics on the 1972 House races released by Common
Cause are also consistent with the theory that it is the "winnability factor"85 which determines the flow of money. These statistics
show that the closer the race, the higher and more equal are the
expenditures. 8
Winning percentage
(Range)

Number of
Candidates

Winner's
expenditures
(Average)

70% to 90%
65% to 70%
60% to 65%
55% to 60%
up to 55%

97
66
91
60
66

$ 38,729
42,212
55,065
73,616
107,378

Loser's
expenditures
(Average)
$

7,479
16,060
30,483
54,600
101,166

[19.3%]
[38%]
[55.3%]
[74.2%]
[94.2%]

As the bracketed numbers clearly indicate, as the victory margin
1973 Hearings, supra note 6, at 58.
All 1974 figures are computed on the basis of figures found in Common Cause Press
Release, April 11, 1975, on file with the Denver Law Journal. The 1972 figures are computed from statistics provided by Common Cause. 31 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 3131-37
(1973).
" See H. ALEXANDER, supra note 5, at 3.
' Common Cause, supra note 7, House Appendix A.
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narrows, the ratio of the loser's expenditures to the winner's rises
remarkably.
There is, however, one other important statistic to which
Common Cause did not address itself. In the 66 races in which
the winner received less than 55 percent of the vote, 40 involved
incumbents. In those 40 races, challengers actually outraised incumbents $106,865 to $95,849.7 This refutes the idea that money
flows to incumbents only. It may suggest that in a closely contested race, one which will be decided by less than 10 percent of
the vote, incumbents may have little or no advantage in raising
funds. The chance of winning in these contests is equally split;
both candidates are seen as possible winners.
Although there is currently a lack of research on the effects
of money in political campaigns 8 and definite conclusions are
impossible to draw, there certainly is some basis for the hypothesis that winnability determines the flow of money. Average incumbents outraise their challengers by a margin of two to one. In
closely contested races the ratio approaches one to one until in
the very closest races, challengers outraise their incumbent opponents. The conclusion may be drawn that it is the winnability
factor which most likely enhances the ability to raise funds and
thereby dictates an inequality of opportunity to communicate a
candidate's views. A candidate's resources may be insufficient
because people generally prefer to contribute to those who will
win, and "there is nothing either illegal or improper in the simple
fact that they prefer to support likely winners rather than losers."89
To achieve the goal of equalizing opportunities to communicate by equalizing availability of funds, a ceiling must be such
as will increase a candidate's winnability factor, for unless one's
chances of winning appear good a candidate will be unable to
raise sufficient funds. But, again, the "Catch-22" applies. A ceiling which is set low, while possibly equalizing expenditure levels
by limiting the amount an incumbent may spend, would not
permit challengers to spend sufficient amounts to overcome the
" This is computed on the basis of figures provided by Common Cause. See note 84
supra. In 1974 there were 81 races in which the winner recieved less than 55 percent of
the vote. The incumbents in these 81 races outraised their challengers by an average of
$90,113 to $79,243, yet 37 of the 81 incumbents were outspent. Id.
' See 1973 Hearings, supra note 6, at 220 (statement by H.E. Alexander).
" Fleishman at 462.
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advantages of incumbency. A ceiling that is set high, while allowing challengers to spend enough money, would do nothing to increase a challenger's winnability factor, that is to convince the
voters that the chances of a challenger's victory are good. A ceiling established at some level in between may effectively remove
the advantages of a low and a high ceiling, leaving only the disadvantages of both.
While the necessity of fund raising certainly serves as a deterrent to some prospective candidates, this deterrence may produce some beneficial results. The oft-quoted log-cabin dream in
our country-that anyone can grow up to be President-may be
true, but it does not mean that everyone deserves to be President,
a Representative, or a Senator or that the road to public office is
an easy one. A campaign must necessarily serve as a screening
process,90 a proving ground where those with insufficient qualifications, or perhaps without sufficient roots in the community or
respect from their peers, will be weeded out.
In summary, a ceiling on expenditures will do nothing to
ensure that a candidate of limited wealth or resources can achieve
even minimum recognition or exposure. Rather, a ceiling serves
only to curtail the outflow to the voters of information about the
candidate who has money or the support to raise it. Additionally,
the deterrent effect of current campaign spending levels may not
be as great a factor as a first glance suggests. If it is winnability
that determines where money goes, a candidate for the House or
Senate, if of high caliber and possessing a good base of community support, should then be a financially attractive candidate
to those sharing his political philosophy. On the other hand, if one
is up against a candidate with high name recognition or popular
appeal, or against one entrenched in office, then it is a low winnability factor, not the cost of campaigning, which would deter one
from running. Under such circumstances, spending ceilings are
not likely to motivate anyone to run who is not already so
inclined. It would be difficult if not impossible to defeat such an
incumbent with equal spending limits. Finally, it is very difficult
to develop a spending ceiling that will be low enough to ensure
one with little financial support a minimum of recognition and
at the same time high enough to enable challengers to mount an
effective campaign against incumbents.
11See

R. WNIN1R, supra note 23, at 5.
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2. Governmental Interest Unrelated to Suppression of
Speech
The third element of the Court's test as set forth by Warren
in O'Brien is that the governmental interest promoted by legislation must be unrelated to the suppression of free speech. Deliberations on the Campaign Act of 197411 reveal a legitimate concern
on the part of Senators and Representatives that the spiraling
costs of political campaigns may endanger the purity of the electoral process. On the other hand, there is also evident a strong
awareness of the possibility that spending limits will serve to
protect the interests of incumbents in power. 2 The incredible lack
of concern for the rights of free speech among a body of lawmakers, many of whom are lawyers, leads one to suspect that the
effect of reducing speech may have been more than an incidental
by-product of a desire to preserve the purity of the electoral process. Senator Buckley, referring to the actions of his colleagues,
pointed out that:
The fear of overly persuasive campaigns, particularly when expressed by incumbent members of Congress, strikes dangerously
close to prohibited suppression of speech because of its content. It
must certainly give the Supreme Court pause when they see officeholders with vested interests in remaining officeholders passing legislation that restricts the ability of potential opponents and average
citizens alike to alter the political makeup of the Congress."

In light of the above, the motive of Congress in passing this legislation deserves particular attention.
The Court has taken the approach that it will seldom view
its judicial function as appropriate to an investigation of what
was on the minds of lawmakers while framing legislation. 4 In
deferring to the judgment of Congress, the Court has emphasized
that where Congress brings a "specially informed legislative competence" to its decisionmaking, then it is "Congress' prerogative
to weigh these competing considerations." 5 Legislative competence should be well developed in the field of campaigns. The
" See generally note 16 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 102 and 105, infra. See also Part H infra.
" 120 CONG. REC. S. 18,537 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1974) (remarks of Senator Buckley).
" See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Daniel v. Family Sec. Life
Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949); Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
" Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 655-56 (1966) (relating to literacy requirements for voting) (footnote omitted).
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Court's view is that the people's recourse to bad law and the
products of ill-conceived motive lies with the ballot box, not with
judicial determinations: "The forum for correction of illconsidered legislation is a responsive legislature."' ,
However, while stating that inquiries into congressional motives and purposes are hazardous,97 the Court does on occasion
entertain an evaluation of congressional purpose behind legislation." One instance in which a legislative purpose and motive
may receive at least a modicum of scrutiny is suggested by
Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15."1 There the Court
said:
The presumption of constitutionality and the approval given "rational" classifications in other types of enactments are based on an
assumption that the institutions of state government are so structured as to represent fairly all the people. However, when the challenge to the statute is in effect a challenge of this basic assumption,
the assumption can no longer serve as the basis for presuming constitutionality. 00

This analysis suggests that the basis of the Court's lack of inquiry
into congressional motive is the assumption that the voters will
serve to check the actions of a responsive legislature should bad
laws be passed or congressional motives be suspect. If a spending
ceiling will reduce the responsiveness of the legislature, the rationale for not scrutinizing congressional motive-the responsiveness of the legislature-is no longer applicable. The crucial question is whether spending ceilings do affect the responsiveness of
the Congress. Ceilings may well serve to perpetuate incumbents
in office by not allowing challengers to spend sufficient funds to
attain a possible victory.' 1' If this were in fact the result of ceilings, then the responsiveness of the Congress would be greatly
impaired and therefore congressional motive should be considered by the Court.
Congress was well aware of the potential effects spending
ceilings would have on future campaigns. Representative Armstrong put it very clearly before the House:
Daniel v. Family Sec. Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 224 (1949).
,7 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968).
" Id. at 385-86.
'
395 U.S. 621 (1969).
"

Id. at 628.
See text accompanying notes 147-50, 157-59 infra.
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Finally, we all know-and I think most of us know in our
hearts-this is a sweetheart incumbent bill. This is a bill which is
going to make it harder than ever to defeat an incumbent of either
party. It sets the kind of limits that makes it almost impossible for
an unknown to become known, and thereby heightens existing advantages which incumbents enjoy.
In view of the overall poor record of the Congress of the United
States, it seems to me the last thing we need to do is to give further
advantages to the incumbent Members of Congress. Let us defeat
this bill and get on to some true reform which is so badly needed.102

Representative Armstrong's comments were followed by those of
Representative Treen, who again asked whether challengers,
under the limits set by the bill, could effectively challenge incum0 3 These
bents."
legitimate constitutional questions raised in the
bill were then summarily dismissed by Representative Wayne
Hayes, who characterized the preceding speech as "90 percent
baloney."" 4
Senator Buckley vigorously opposed the spending limits as
set, denouncing them as being highly protective of incumbents:
It is my firm belief that a certain amount of money must be
spent by a challenger just to offset the incumbent's advantage ....
If this assumption is correct, the uniform spending limits...
can only aid incumbents because they make it impossible for a
challenger to spend the money necessary to overcome the incumbent's advantage. It is this feature . . . that makes it both fair and
accurate to characterize the bill as the Incumbent Protection Act of
1974.1"'

Considering these statements and Congress' relative lack of
concern regarding the constitutional questions inherent in any
spending ceiling, the Court, fearing that the responsiveness of the
Congress may in some degree be reduced, should take a close look
at congressional motive to see whether, as Senator Buckley
phrased it, the Congress has come "dangerously close to prohibited suppression of speech because of its content."''0
3. Restrictions on Speech Merely Incidental and Necessary
to Promote the Governmental Interest
"
103

120
Id.

CONG.

REc. H.R. 7900 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1974).

' Id. at H.R. 7901. One cannot tell to whom Representative Hayes was referring
(Armstrong or Treen or both), or which part of the speech was the 10 percent not constituting "baloney."
1 Id. at S. 4938 (daily ed. April 1, 1974).
30 Supra note 93.
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The final element of Chief Justice Warren's test in O'Brien
is that "the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest" to be protected.' 7
While it has been suggested throughout this note that there
are open to Congress more effective alternatives to accomplish
the goals sought to be achieved by spending ceilings, there is no
actual requirement by the Court that less drastic alternatives to
achieve certain goals be available before an unconstitutional infringement on free speech will be struck down.' However, if there
are less drastic means of achieving these goals, then it is less
likely that these ceilings will be allowed to stand. The Court has
said:
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The
breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less
drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose. 1 1

There are less drastic means to achieve political equality on
the campaign trail. To combat the ability of the large donors to
gain influence with federal officials there are several approaches
available. First, there is the alternative of a ceiling on the
amounts an individual may contribute to any one campaign. This
is the approach taken by Congress in the Campaign Act of 1974.
The amount which an individual may contribute to any one
federal candidate is now limited to $1,000 per election"" and
"[n]o individual shall make contributions aggregating more
than $25,000 in any calendar year." '' Although beyond the scope
of this note, there are many of the same constitutional problems
391 U.S. at 377.
'" United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 267 (1967):
It is not our function to examine the validity of that congressional judgment.
Neither is it our function to determine whether [a particular program]
exhausts the possible alternatives to the statute under review. We are concerned solely with determining whether the statute before us has exceeded
the bounds imposed by the Constitution when First Amendment rights are
at stake. The task of writing legislation which will stay within those bounds
has been committed to Congress.
0 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
"'
See note 60 supra.
18 U.S.C.A. § 608(b)(3).
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inherent in limitations on contributions as there are in expenditure ceilings. The effects, though, are surely not as great.' 2
Another less drastic means to achieve this goal would be to
impose a heavy tax on any contributions over a certain limit. The
revenues could be placed in the Presidential Election Campaign
Fund" 3 or earmarked to defray the costs of the Federal Election
Commission, established to administer the Campaign Act of
1974."11 In addition, the size of the present tax credit/deduction
could be increased so as to encourage a greater number of small
donors."S

To help ensure at least a modicum of equality in campaign
opportunities, the concept of a floor rather than a ceiling should
be carefully investigated:
To counteract the advantages of incumbency or of wealth, we
need not enact questionable ceilings, but rather look toward establishing floors. By floors are meant minimal levels of access to the
electorate for all legally qualified candidates."'

The most attractive feature of floors is that they entail no restrictions on first amendment rights." 7
To promote the concept of a floor at least one campaign
reformer has advocated free mailing privileges or public subsidies
to ensure minimal exposure to challengers." 8 The bill, which was
passed by the Senate and sent into conference, did in fact contain
a public financing provision for House and Senate races, as well
as for presidential contests."' The use of the frank (free mailing
privileges) by candidates is hardly a novel concept, yet the reluctance of incumbents to share their free mailing privileges with
,,2 For a general discussion of the constitutional issues involved in limitations on
contributions, see A. ROSENTHAL, supra note 54, at 12-29.
"' See Ir.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 9006(a). This fund is to be used to finance presidential campaigns, starting with the 1976 elections. Id. §§ 9001-06.
2 U.S.C.A. § 437c (Supp. I, 1975).
I, One may currently elect either a tax deduction or a tax credit. A tax deduction of
$50, or $100 for those filing a joint return, is allowed. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 218. Or
one may take a tax credit of one-half of all political contributions, with a maximum credit
of $12.50, or $25.00 for those filing a joint return. Id. § 41.
1973 Hearings, supra note 6, at 224 (statement by H. E. Alexander).
Fleishman at 479.
,,8 1973 Hearings, supra note 6, at 224 (statement by H. E. Alexander).
"'

"7

' See S. 3044, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 502(c)(1)(A) & (B)(1974). These public financing
provisions for House and Senate campaigns were removed from the Senate bill in Conference Committee.
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challengers, plus the high cost of such a proposal' appear to have
blocked any attempt to get this idea through Congress.
Although requiring a far greater financial commitment by
the federal government, these alternatives would accomplish the
same goals as those sought to be achieved by expenditure ceilings.
They would result in less, if any, infringement on first amendment rights. It would appear that because there are alternatives
available to Congress, a ceiling on expenditures would not meet
the fourth criterion of the Court's test in O'Brien.
This evaluation of the component elements of the Court's
test of the constitutionality of restrictions on free speech, as applied to the spending ceilings on political campaigns, leaves grave
questions as to whether a limitation on expenditures will pass the
test of constitutionality when brought before a court of law. Limitations appear not only to fall far short of achieving the goals they
were designed to promote, but also to infringe protected freedoms
far more heavily than would alternatives available to the Congress.
D.

Prior Restraint

In none of the many cases sustaining the right of Congress
to regulate federal elections has a congressional attempt to limit
the amount or content of political speech been sustained.' 2' It is
hard to see why the Court would start a new precedent in a case
involving the constitutionality of the Campaign Act of 1974. It
has been suggested that spending ceilings would infringe primarily the amount rather than the content of speech and that the
balancing test would be appropriate to weigh the constitutionality of the law.'2 In Konigsberg v. State Bar1 3 Justice Harlan
discussed governmental attempts to limit the unfettered exercise
as opposed to the content of speech:
[Gleneral regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content
of speech but incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not
been regarded as the type of law the First or Fourteenth Amendment
forbade Congress or the States to pass, when they have been found
justified by subordinating valid governmental interests, a prerequis"
"2'
2

See 120 CONG. REc. S. 5080 (daily ed. April 2, 1974).
Fleishman at 449-50 and cases cited therein.
Comment, Free Speech Implications of Campaign Expenditure Ceilings, 7 HARV.

Civ. RiGrrs-Civ. Lm. L. REv. 214, 224 (1972).
1- 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
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ite to constitutionality which has necessarily involved a weighing of
the governmental interest involved."

It is possible that a spending ceiling on campaign expenditures
has the effect of limiting the content, not just the exercise, of
speech. If this is true, then the balancing test may not be the
appropriate test of constitutionality. Limiting the content of
speech may constitute a prior restraint on freedom of expression.
Arguably, a candidate who is prohibited in advance by a
ceiling on expenditures from spending more than a specified
amount of money is a victim of prior restraints on his freedom of
expression. This is particularly true in that certain types of campaign activities, such as the distribution of literature, are recog5
nized by the Court as vital elements of the right to free speech.
It may be true that a ceiling on spending would primarily limit
the amount as opposed to the content of speech. However, the
small percentage of the time that a ceiling would limit the content of speech raises the most serious constitutional questions and
poses a grave threat to our electoral process.
An election is by definition limited in time-it ends on election day. No speech, charge, countercharge, or response can have
any effect on a voter once the "X" is made or the lever pulled.
Anything worth saying by a candidate must be expressed prior to
the time the people vote. A spending ceiling could substantially
alter the nature of this process of campaign interaction. A candidate who had spent his limit could not turn to television or radio
to answer a last minute charge by his opponent, nor could he buy
time to air his response to, or opinion of, an event of major significance occurring just prior to election day. The speech that would
be barred is no ordinary speech, "For speech concerning public
affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self2
government."1
In Mills v. Alabama' the Supreme Court invalidated a state
statute the effect of which was similar to that which may result
from a ceiling on expenditures. Alabama had passed a law which
barred electioneering on election day. One of the daily newspapers ran an endorsement of a candidate in its election day issue
124

Id. at 50-51.

'
'

Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).

l

384 U.S. 214 (1966).
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and was prosecuted for violation of the statute. The Court, after
discussing the importance of free speech in the political arena,
went on to say:
The state statute leaves people free to hurl their campaign charges
up to the last minute of the day before election. The law . . . then
goes on to make it a crime to answer those "last-minute" charges
on election day, the only time they can be effectively answered.',"

It seems unlikely the Court would strike the Alabama statute, yet
let a spending ceiling stand when the very same evil condemned
in Mills may be generated by limitations on expenditures.
To punish a candidate for poor budgeting by cutting off his
means to communicate with the voters is a severe penalty. Such
a penalty punishes not only the candidate but, more importantly,
the public at large. Under the first amendment, the voters have
a very precious and essential right to hear a candidate's response
to a charge, or his reaction to an event.'29 This right is not based
on whether the candidate has spent his limit. The Court has
stated that:
[T]he State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First
Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge. The
right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to
utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the
right to read . . . . Without those peripheral rights the specific
rights would be less secure.'"

One cannot, under the burden of a ceiling, punish the overspender without punishing the public also.
The effect of a ceiling may also be to induce a candidate to
develop a strategy whereby he attempts to deplete the resources
of his opposition in order to push him toward the limit. It is far
more difficult to undo damage of a timely, unfounded charge than
to make the charge in the first place. A candidate's inability to
meet a charge from his opponent is hardly desirable.
In two recent cases courts have been unwilling to uphold a
prior restraint on speech. In its decision involving a suit by the
government to enjoin publication of the "Pentagon Papers,"' 3 ' the
Supreme Court faced the issue of prior restraint. The justification
'12 Id.
25

''
'3,

at 220.
See generally Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965).
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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for the desired restraint on publication was the national security
of the country, which the government feared would be compromised if the "papers" were published.'3 2 In ruling against the
United States, the Court held that the government had not met
the requisite burden of justification for the restraint. 33 The rule
had been stated in an earlier case that, "[a]ny system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.' ' 3
A recent California case3 5 involved an injunction against further publication by a candidate for public office of allegedly libelous newspaper excerpts, or of any versions of the excerpts, about
his opponent. Recognizing that prior restraints are only permissible under extraordinary circumstances, such as to prevent disclosure of military secrets in time of war or "to prevent the utterance
of words that may have the effect of force,"'' 3 the California Supreme Court ruled that the prior restraint imposed on the plaintiff candidate could not be upheld, even though the issue involved
37
a restraint of libelous material.
Once a prior restraint is established, the party defending the
restraint has the burden of overcoming the "heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity.' ' 3 The fact that a ceiling on
expenditures may act as a prior restraint on speech is one of the
most forceful arguments against the constitutionality of ceilings
as a method of campaign reform. There is little to suggest that a
ceiling on campaign expenditures, which can act as a prior restraint, can withstand the heavy presumption against its validity.
II. SPENDING LIMrrs AND EQUAL PROTECTION
A. The Advantages of Incumbency
One effect of spending limitations is that challengers may no
longer be able to spend more money in a congressional race than
their incumbent opponents. It is the contention of this note that
,"2Id. at 718 (Black, J., concurring).
'm Id. at 714.
114 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 37 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). See also Organization for a
Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971). One advocating prior restraints "carries a
heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint." Id. at 419.
' Wilson v. Los Angeles County Superior Court, 43 U.S.L.W. 2379 (Cal. March 4,
1975).
In Id.
137 Id.

"I Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
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equal spending limitations for incumbents and challengers may
in effect deny the latter the equal protection of the laws inherent
in the due process clause of the fifth amendment.'39 This aspect
of the new law presents another serious danger to our political
system. Unfortunately, because full disclosure of campaign contributions did not go into effect until April of 1972,140 no comprehensive conclusions can be drawn in regard to the amount of
spending necessary to defeat incumbents. However, preliminary
conclusions, based on the 1972 and 1974 congressional races, reveal some ominous statistics for challengers hoping to unseat current officeholders and lend support to the argument that a spending ceiling may have grossly unequal effects on incumbents and
challengers.
During the last half century, incumbent Senators and Representatives have been successful in more than 80 and 90 percent
of their campaigns respectively. 4' Between 1956 and 1972, House
incumbents won 3,350 of 3,551 races, for a winning percentage of
94.34. Senate incumbents fared slightly worse, winning 222 of 261
or 84.67 percent.' The 1972 House elections marked the third
straight election in which over 95 percent of incumbents were
victorious,"' while in the 1972 Senate races only 6 incumbents
met defeat. The primary and general elections of 1974, a "disaster
year" for incumbents, saw over 87 percent of House incumbents
re-elected, while 85 percent of the incumbent Senators were successful."' Figures such as these led one commentator to write,
"There is a tendency to believe that, aside from isolated instances
where an over-riding issue is present, there is little excuse for
defeat."" 5
Based on the impressive percentage of incumbents' victories,
See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 406, 86 Stat. 20.
This Act became effective 60 days after its passage on February 7, 1972.
141 120 CONG. REc. S. 4938 (daily ed. April 1, 1974) (remarks of Senator Buckley).
142Hearings on H.R. 7612 at 2 (Supp.) (statement by Representative Cleveland).
31 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 3130 (1973).
"' For the 1974 congressional election results see 32 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. (Nov. 9,
1974). In 1974, 48 incumbents were defeated in races for the House; 8 in the primaries, 40
in the general election. Forty-four incumbents elected not to run. On the Senate side, four
incumbents were defeated, two in the primaries and two in the general election. Seven
incumbents chose not to run for re-election. Id.
145 120 CONG. REc. S. 4938 (daily ed. April 1, 1974) (quote by Charles Clapp in remarks
of Senator Buckley).
14
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one would suspect that the American people view the current
legislature and its performance with high regard. But Senator
Buckley points out that the reverse is true:
Recent poll figures force one to the conclusion that the Congress
is not exactly held in the highest esteem by the American people.
In fact, as most of us are aware a number of pundits have observed
that we are presently less popular even than the President [Nixon]
with a collective approval rating of but 21 percent.'46

According to Common Cause, great sums of money are required to defeat such disapproved legislators.'47 In the November
1972 races for the House, only 10 incumbents were defeated, and
8 of the 10 were outspent by their challengers.'48 It took an average
of $125,52111 to defeat these incumbents. On the Senate side,
only six incumbents were defeated, and four of the six were outspent. 5 0
The 1974 House elections proved to be an anomaly in the
recent trend. Although over 95 percent of all incumbent Representatives to run for re-election were successful in each of the
three preceeding elections,' 5 ' the percentage dropped below 90
percent in 1974. '52 The number of incumbents losing their seats
in 1974 nearly quadrupled in respect to the number who lost in
each of the three preceeding elections. This startling increase in
the number of unsuccessful incumbents is in large part a result
of the Watergate scandal and the effect the revelations of political
corruption had on the minds of the voters. 53
As a result of Watergate, 1974 was a relatively easy year for
challengers, particularly Democratic ones. This being the case,
one can hypothesize that although challengers have to spend
large amounts of money and in many cases outspend their oppo..I
Id. (remarks of Senator Buckley).
...Common Cause, supra note 7, "Common Cause Releases Study of 1972 Congressional Campaign Finances."
,4 See 31 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 3130-37 (1973).
"' Common Cause, supra note 7, House Appendix B. It is not possible, on the basis
of the 1972 or 1974 spending figures, to apportion a certain percentage of total expenditures by a candidate to the general election and a certain percentage to the primary.
Reporting was not required for each election separately.
110
31 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., supra note 148.
151 See note 143 supra.
52 See note 144 supra and accompanying text.
" To attribute this "high" turnover to the state of the economy ignores the fact that
of the 40 incumbents to lose, 36 were Republicans and only 4 were Democrats. 32 CONG.
Q. WEEKLY REP. 3066 (1974).
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nents to be successful, the spending in 1974 need not have been
as high as in 1972 because incumbency in certain districts in 1974
was more a disadvantage than an advantage.'5 4 It would also follow that knowing the disadvantage they faced, incumbents would
be less likely to allow themselves to be outspent. This apparently
was the case.' 55 Spending figures for the 1974 campaigns support
the above hypothesis, that given the over-riding issue of Watergate, challengers needed less money to be successful. Based on an
evaluation of the 1974 spending reports filed by the candidates
and committees, an average of $100,468 was spent by the challengers who were successful in the 1974 general election, as compared to $125,521 in 1972.11 Additionally, of the 40 incumbents
defeated in the November 1974 elections, 22, or 55 percent, were
outspent as compared to 80 percent in 1972.11
While neither the average amount spent by successful challengers, nor the percentage of challengers outspending their opponents, was as high in 1974 as in 1972, even considering the impact
of the Watergate affair the 1974 figures are consistent with the
theory that the average challenger must be prepared to spend a
large amount of money, as well as to outspend his opponent, if
the chances of victory are to be good. When only 12 to 13 percent
of the incumbents to run for re-election are defeated5 8 and over
one-half of that 12 percent are outspent, 59 the ability to outspend
must be regarded as an important factor.
On the basis of the successful record established by incumbents over the last half century, and of the expenditure statistics
for congressional races in the 1972 and 1974 elections, a strong
argument can be advanced that equal expenditure limitations are
inherently unequal in their impact on incumbents and challengers.
15, Four of the 36 Republicans who lost were members of the House Judiciary Committee and had consistently supported the President during the television impeachment
hearings. They were: David Dennis, Joseph Maraziti, Wiley Mayne, and Charles Sandman. Id. But see id. at 3066, stating that three, Dennis, Mayne, and Sandman, faced
problems before the impeachment inquiry began.
"' In 1972 the 40 incumbents who lost in 1974 spent on the average $69,199. Faced
with serious opposition in 1974, their average expenditures rose to $101,173. See note 84
supra.

156 Id.

157Id.
's'
See note 144 supra and accompanying text.
"'
See text accompanying note 157 supra.
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If it is not, as polls suggest, a high regard by the American
people that returns large percentages of incumbents to Washington each election, there must be other factors. Most of these can
be found in the nature of elective offices. Senators and Representatives are elected to serve their constituencies and the American
people. To fulfill this role, they must have at their disposal resources such as staff allowances, office expenses, access to media,
and the frank. Staff allowances of $204,000 are allowed to congressional officeholders.610 An incumbent thus has at his disposal
expert advice and a continuous source of research into matters of
public concern. The challenger must often start from scratch in
research on issues and development of alternative policies, and
this may require the hiring of staff assistants at his own expense.
In addition, incumbents are entitled to have several district offices from which to provide constituent services. By far the majority of work conducted in a district office involves case work,' 6'
solving problems for constituents. Casework involves people, and
people mean votes. Even a courteous reply to a letter written to
a congressman can so impress the constituent that it ensures the
62
incumbent a vote.1
Access to the media is also an important advantage inherent
in incumbency.' 3 While incumbents do not have the networks at
their control, a well-seasoned politician can certainly manipulate
press coverage by introduction or sponsorship of key legislation,
delivery of major policy addresses or statements on critical
events, or the announcement of a press conference. While the
challenger may attempt all the above except the introduction and
sponsorship of legislation, his words are not official words, and are
not apt to be accorded the same weight given those of an incumbent.
Perhaps the greatest advantage enjoyed by incumbents is the
'' Interview with Genie Ermoyan, Administrative Assistant to Representative Abner
Mikva, in Washington, D.C., Mar. 18, 1975.
"I Estimates indicate that from 60 to 75 percent of the work in a district office

involves casework. Telephone interviews with Jack Marco and Pearl Alperstein, District
Managers for Representatives Abner Mikva and Tim Wirth, respectively, April 12, 1975.
"2 While canvassing a neighborhood in October 1974, the author talked to an elderly
lady who had been so impressed by the official reply she had received from her congressman that she had framed it. Her vote had been sewn up by this letter.
" See 120 CONG. Rc. H.R. 10,337 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1974) (remarks of Representative Treen).
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frank-the ability to send official mail postage free.' 4 Free mailing is vital to the functioning of a congressional office, and if used
with an eye toward re-election can be used to gather a very broad
base of support by convincing voters that their representative is
working hard and is doing as much for them as possible. The
frank is used in essentially two ways: First, in the normal day to
day correspondence of an office; and second, to send district-wide
newsletters or questionnaires to the residents of a district. Members of the House enjoy one further advantage in their districtwide mailings-each letter need not be individually addressed,
but may be sent under the label "Postal Patron, 'X' Congressional District."'' 5 The advantage this affords a mass mailer may
only be properly appreciated by recognizing the many hours spent
hand addressing or typing and sticking on labels. The cost savings
of the "Postal Patron" privilege can be enormous.' 6 In addition,
if a candidate exceeds his allowance for printing costs in mailing
franked mail, he may claim as a tax deduction the excess expenditure.6 7 To duplicate the output of franked mail by an incumbent
could cost a challenger over $200,000.16s
Nothing that has been said regarding the postal advantages
or office and staff expenses is in any way intended to suggest these
perquisites of elective office are excessive or unnecessary. Rather,
the availability and wide use of these privileges are essential to
the proper functioning of an office. What needs to be recognized,
however, particularly by those who establish the ceilings on campaign expenditures, is that these advantages do exist and that
they must be taken into account when imposing restrictions on
expenditures. This must be recognized for one important reason:
In practice, there is a very thin line between what can be considered official business and that which borders on electioneering.
Liberal use of the above privileges may increase substantially the
inherent inequalities which exist between incumbents and challengers.
See 39 U.S.C. § 3210 (1970).
39 U.S.C.A. § 3210(d)(1)(A) (Supp. 1975).
"I A cost of $29 per 1,000 letters was quoted by American Products, a Chicago firm,
for the addressing and processing required for mass mailings. Thus, if a congressional
district has 168,000 households, as in the Tenth District of Illinois, the cost would be
$4,872 just for the addressing and processing. Citizens Committee for Abner J. Mikva
Press Release, July 18, 1974, on file with the Denver Law Journal.
,6 Fleishman at 469.
,' See note 166 supra.
"14
165
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The use of the frank is for all practical purposes limited only
by the conscience and ethical standards of those in office,' 89 a fact
which may appear frightening in light of the events of recent
years. It has been suggested that an excessive use of the frank will
be singled out by the voters, and therefore one must not abuse
the privilege for fear of retaliation at the polls.7 0 Experience dictates that this is not always the case, perhaps because it can be
very hard for a voter to perceive the widespread effects a monthly
newsletter can have. In Colorado's Second Congressional District,
Democratic challenger Tim Wirth tried to make an issue of his
opponent's use of the frank, but without success."' In the Tenth
Congressional District in Illinois, district-wide mailings were
being sent out at a rate of almost one a month by the incumbent
Representative, with three arriving at every home in the district
within a 4-week period in the summer months preceding the election of 1974. Yet in a survey taken in that district, one of the most
affluent and well educated in the country,' the people expressed
almost no concern with this recurring use of the frank,'73 so the
challenger dropped the issue. This indicates that if the frank is
effectively used, it is almost without practical limitation.
Representative Bill Frenzel introduced into the
CongressionalRecord some illuminating statistics regarding the
frank."' According to these statistics, the timing of franked mail,
as indicated by activity in the congressional folding room, is significant. The work piles up every September and October of even
numbered years-the congressional election years. In September
and October of 1968, 1970, and 1972, there was twice as much
work in the folding room as in those same months in the years of
1967, 1969, and 1971. Further, in October of 1968, 1970, and 1972,
the folding room averaged about 85 percent more work than it did
in the average month of those years.'75 One reason for this increase
is clear: As the congressional session comes to an end, the mem0
170

H.

PENNtMAN & R. WiTNER, supra note 19, at 17.

Id.

"' Interview with Representative Tim Wirth in Denver, Feb. 13, 1975.

N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1974, § 6 (magazine), at 75.
m Respondents were asked to characterize as "fair" or "unfair" the following statement: "Sam Young has spent a lot of taxpayers' money sending out a newsletter each
month." The result was: Fair, 20%; Unfair, 67%; and Not Sure, 13% (Poll conducted by
Peter Hart Research Associates, for Abner J. Mikva, Aug. and Sept., 1974).
"1 120 CONG. REc. H.R. 8424 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1974).
Id.
'7'
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bers of Congress send their final reports back to their constituencies, ' complete with pictures of themselves and expressions of
appreciations for being allowed to serve them during the preceeding two years. This is not necessarily improper, but, again, it is
something that should be taken into account in establishing the
level of ceilings. It obviously was not in the 1974 Act.
It is not sufficient to discount these advantages of incumbency by saying, as one congressman has said, that, "People do
not vote for incumbents unless they are doing a decent job.'
It may be because many incumbents do only a "decent job"
that the Congress receives such low ratings in the polls.
Representative Treen has said:
[I]f one is going to defeat an incumbent, he has got to expose the
incumbent's record.
That means that we have got to go to massive newspaper, radio
and television coverage to talk about the record. He cannot do that
on the spending limits we have in this bill.'78

As indicated by a majority of the races where incumbents were
defeated in 1972 and 1974, "exposing the record" usually requires
outspending the officeholder.' 79
In an effort to neutralize the tremendous advantages of incumbency, Senator Buckley introduced during the debate on the
proposed ceilings an amendment to provide a challenger with a
spending ceiling of 130 percent of the amount which could be
spent by the incumbents.1 80 His amendment, tabled in April of
1974 when first introduced, was later reintroduced and defeated
by a vote of 17 to 61 just prior to the passage of the bill by the
Senate.' 8
Statistics show that a large percentage of incumbents who
lose are outspent, an event which, as a result of the ceilings established in the Campaign Act of 1974, may never happen again; an
176Id.

Id. at H. 7848 (Aug. 7, 1974) (remarks of Representative Pike).
,7'
Id. at H. 7900-01 (Aug. 8, 1974).

,7See text accompanying notes 148, 150, & 157 supra.
"8 120 CONG. REc. S. 4937 (daily ed. April 1, 1974).
(c) No candidate who is not an incumbent may make expenditures in
connection with his campaign for nomination for election, or for election, to
any Federal office in excess of 130 percent of the amount of expenditures
which an incumbent candidate may make . .

Id.

Id. at S. 18,537 (Oct. 8, 1974).

..
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incumbent willing and able to spend his limit cannot be outspent
by a challenger seeking to overcome the advantages which inhere
to incumbents. An officeholder in this situation has a large edge
in his race for re-election. And contrary to the renowned hare, he
is unlikely to take a nap off to the side of the trail.
B. Equal Protection of the Laws and the Application of
Spending Ceilings
The U.S. Constitution provides that no state may "deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."' 8 2 Although this prohibition applies only to the states, it is
well settled that the equal protection clause is applicable to the
federal government through the due process clause of the fifth
amendment, when "discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to
be violative of due process."' 83
A maximum ceiling of $84,000 on the expenditures of each
candidate for each election creates on its face no "suspect categories" or "invidious discrimination." No one candidate is put into
a classification different than another, and each is allowed equal
spending. This is not, however, enough to satisfy the requirements of due process. The Supreme Court, in its decision in Yick
Wo v. Hopkins's4 looked beyond the mere "on its face" test of the
fourteenth amendment and went into the effects of the law as it
was applied. It is now settled that although no classifications
exist on the face of a statute, unjustifiable discrimination resulting from the application of a law may be "as invidious a discrimination as if [the statute] had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment."'" 5 The heavy burden which
equal spending ceilings impose on the campaign effort of almost
any challenger could constitute such discrimination.
The discrimination promoted by spending ceilings would be
even greater in the case of third-party candidates.'" Generally a
third party has no grass roots organization as do the Republicans
or Democrats, organizations whose expenditures for general activ...U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

' Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
'' 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
"s Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). See also
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 194 (1964); Lassiter v. Northhampton County Bd.
of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959).
," See Redish, supra note 65, at 919.
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ities, though clearly inhering to the benefit of a candidate of its
own party, may not come within the purview of the ceiling." 7 The
classic example of the advantages of party organization is the
case of a Democratic candidate running for election in the City
of Chicago. While such a candidate has the benefit of one of the
most unbeatable precinct organizations in the country, he would
have to report, for all the benefit he received from the grass roots
Democratic organization, not a penny of expenditure. To suggest
that equal limitations do not discriminate in such a situation is
pure folly. And while the argument can be made that a ceiling
does not prevent a third party from establishing an organization,
this is often impractical in that an organization is more likely to
form around a winner, rather than to develop to form a winner.
The potential effect of inhibiting the growth of third parties has
8
been condemned by the Court in Williams v. Rhodes.""
Another discriminatory effect of spending ceilings exists
where an incumbent is challenged in the primary, particularly in
one-party districts, where the primary is in effect the election.
The number of such districts is not insignificant. In the 1974
general elections, 46 races-over 10 percent of all races for the
House-were unopposed.' Unlike a challenger to an incumbent
of the opposing party in a two-party district, a challenger in a
one-party district does not have a primary and an additional
primary allotment of $84,000 with which to build his name recognition, present his programs, and develop the grass roots organi"' This "loophole" exists because activities such as a voter registration drive, a canvass to determine party preference, and an election day "get out the vote" campaign
(which is based on the results of the canvass-one only brings to the polls those who are
sure to vote "properly") if conducted by a party organization inhere to the benefit of every
candidate of the party conducting the activities, from federal candidates down to the local
dog catcher. These activities may not, in fact, be authorized by a particular candidate,
even though he would receive the benefits of them. If, on the other hand, any one or all of
the above activities are carried out on behalf of a federal candidate, then those expenditures would go toward a candidate's ceiling.
(B) an expenditure is made on behalf of a candidate . . . if it is made
by(i) an authorized committee or any other agent of the candidate
for the purposes of making any expenditure; or
(ii) any person authorized or requested by the candidate, an
authorized committee of the candidate, or an agent of the candidate,
to make the expenditure.
18 U.S.C.A. § 608(c)(2)(B) (Supp. 1, 1975).
IU 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968). See also Redish, supra note 65, at 919.
" See 32 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 3084-91 (1974).
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zation necessary for the election day contest with the incumbent.
Rather, these challengers have a maximum of only $84,000 at
their disposal with which to overcome the advantages of incumbency and to carry out their campaign activities. The ceilings
imposed in the Campaign Act of 1974 hardly reflect the difficulty
of such a challenge.
A final form of possible discrimination resulting from spending ceilings is that inherent in setting universal limits throughout
the entire country, without taking into account local variances in
cost of such vital campaign expenses as radio and television
time.'90 A 30-second prime time television spot can vary from $200
in Phoenix to $4,600 in New York City.'9 ' By enacting the same
ceilings for New York as for Phoenix, the people in the City of
New York will be given far less opportunity to see and know their
candidates than will the voters in Phoenix.' 2 While this discriminatory aspect is most exemplified by media costs, the same is no
doubt true, though to a lesser extent, of printing costs, newspaper
advertising, and salaries. The difficulty of arriving at a fair ceiling
for each region of the country presents another difficulty in enacting spending ceilings.
The discriminatory effects of spending ceilings on campaigns
thus fall into three categories: (1) A challenger may not be able
to overcome the natural advantage of incumbency should an incumbent decide to spend the limit; (2) third-party candidates are
discriminated against in that they generally lack the organizations available to major party candidates; and (3) challengers to
incumbents in primaries face the disadvantage of having to defeat an incumbent with only $84,000 of expenditures.
Equal ceilings for challengers and incumbents will, in many
cases, make it very difficult for a less well known challenger to
present himself and his platform effectively before the electorate.
If the Court should find that the limitations on free speech which
result from ceilings on campaign expenditures fall hardest in
their application upon the challenger, then this discriminatory
effect can only be justified by some "compelling state interest"
sought to be achieved by the legislation.'13 Although the purity of
,0 See Fleishman at 467. See generally Hearings on H.R. 7612 at 4 (Supp.).
"' H. PENNumN & R. WhiTER, supra note 19, at 14.

,12
See Note, supra note 56, at 661.
"' The "compelling state interest" standard is applied where a fundamental interest
is involved. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
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the electoral process is an important concern, it cannot be said
that this interest will necessarily be enhanced by ceilings placed
on spending. The previous evaluation of the governmental interest promoted by these ceilings' 4 should leave doubts in many
minds as to whether any interest-other than that of incumbents-is really promoted by limits on campaign spending.
CONCLUSION

Reform of campaign funding is long overdue. Money has
been and will continue to be the root of corruption and impropriety among elected officials. Until steps are taken which will
assure the American public that political contributions are not
given in order to extract political favors or gain political clout, the
aura of suspicion which surrounds campaign contributions will
continue to hang precariously over the American political process. Unfortunately, a problem which is so easily identified is not
so readily cured.
The governmental interest in re-establishing some purity in
our electoral process is as powerful an interest as can be conceived
in our democratic society. If the method by which our leaders are
chosen is tainted with potential or actual abuse, then the decisions these officials render must be suspect. Yet no matter how
great the evil created and no matter how powerful the interest to
be served, the solution relied upon must be consistent with the
principles established in the Constitution. Absent constitutional
problems, relatively simple answers might suffice. In the case of
campaign reform, however, the first amendment requires a complex solution. A spending ceiling is an example of a simple answer, one which ignores the first and fifth amendments as well as
political reality.
Suit has already been filed challenging the Campaign Act of
1974,111 and one of the numerous causes of action is aimed at the
ceiling on expenditures as a violation of the right to free speech
and due process.' The purity of the electoral process is thus in
the hands of the judiciary. In the long run, this purity might be
better served by the elimination of a spending ceiling as a means
to achieve it.
Robert W Drake
, See text accompanying notes 55-90 supra.
121 CONG. REc. S. 2014-20 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 1975). The suit has been filed in the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia by Senator James
Buckley and former Senator Eugene McCarthy.
I Id. at 2018.

